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ADVOCATING FOR A CHANGE IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS HIV STATUTE: PUTTING AN END
TO PHYSICIAN UNCERTAINTY
I. INTRODUCTION

Historically there have been many conflicts between individual rights and
the state's interest in protecting public health.' Such conflicts determine whether
personal liberties outweigh the need to safeguard public health.2 As we gauge
this war amongst ourselves, one thing must not be forgotten - individual privacy
is paramount but human life is sacred.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HV), the virus known to cause Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), has perpetuated this conflict, spawning
more lawsuits than any other disease.' As is common with any new area of law,
the issues are not yet settled, as a result, jurisdictions differ substantially in their
application of the legal principles. Currently, the medical and legal duties
confronting physicians who treat HIV-infected patients are inconsistent among
the jurisdictions and, in some areas, inconsistent with established law.' In
almost all states, a physician is required to report cases of communicable

'See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602, 97 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1976) (favoring
public safety concerns over policy of confidentiality); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 137, 529 P.2d 553, 561 (1974) (finding disclosure to state health
officials not an impermissible invasion of privacy per se); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb.
224,225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (finding no common law physician-patient privilege
to protect disclosure).
2 See cases cited supra note 1.
Francis & Chin, The Prevention ofAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the
United States: An Objective Strategy for Medicine, Public Health, Business and the
Community, 257 JAMA 1357, 1357 (1987); Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in

the United States, 36 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 801, 801 (1987). HIV was
previously referred to as the human T-cell lymphotropic virus type Il/lymphadenopathy
associated virus (HTLV-I/LAV). Francis & Chin, supra, at 1357.
4 See, e.g., CAL.

[HEALTH

& SAFETY] CODE § 121015 (West 1996) (authorizing

disclosure to spouse of patient, needle sharing contacts, and known sexual partners); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-4-1402 (1989 Replacement Vol. & Supp. 1995) (requiring physician to
report HIV status); TEx. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE ANN. § 81.041 (West 1992) (listing
HIV as a reportable disease).
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diseases to public health officials.' In the context of HIV, however, which is not
only contagious but fatal, physicians are prohibited from doing so.6
The duty of confidentiality imposed upon health care providers conflicts
with the duty to warn. Since 1986, Massachusetts has statutorily prohibited
physicians from disclosing a patient's HIV status without first obtaining the
patient's written informed consent.7 Despite this mandate of confidentiality, a
1985 case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), Alberts v. Devine,'
imposed upon physicians a duty to warn in situations where their patient poses
a serious danger to third parties.9 This leaves physicians facing a no-win
situation. On one hand, they face potential liability to the patient for
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. On the other hand, they
face potential liability to the endangered third party for not disclosing the
diagnosis. Massachusetts law should be restructured to provide physicians with
a definite legal course of action.
This article advocates retaining the duty to warn in a limited context and
thus proposes that more needs to be done to protect the public health. It outlines
the changes in the law which are not only justified, but are essential to moderate
the rate of HIV infections which have left a trail of human tragedy in their wake.
A narrowly tailored response directed at protecting society from an incurable,
fatal disease, while shielding the patient to the extent possible and protecting
physicians from uncertain liability, is appropriate.
II. HISTORY
A. The Physician-PatientPrivilegeand the Duty of Confidentiality

Unauthorized disclosure of a patient's test results or other medical records
is now prohibited by statute in most states.' 0 This is frequently referred to as the
5 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0031 (West 1993) (requiring medical

professionals to report confirmed or suspected cases of infectious disease); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:4-15 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) (requiring listed communicable diseases to be
reported within 12 hours to state health department); TEx. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE ANN.
§ 81.041 (West 1992) (including HIV and AIDS as reportable diseases).
6 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (1994) (requiring informed consent for both
testing and disclosure).

7Id.
'
'

395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985).
Id. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124.

IC See, e.g., CAL. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE § 121015 (West Supp. 1996)

(prohibiting HIV disclosures without following stated procedure for disclosure and selected
notification); IDAHO CODE § 39-610 (1988) (promulgating procedures for collecting and
disclosing confidential public health records); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §214-420(2)
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physician-patient privilege, violation of which provides for a remedy sounding
in tort.I

This privilege, however, is not recognized at common law."

The

physician-patient privilege is a statutory response to the need for patients to fully3
disclose to their physician all information needed for appropriate treatment.'
Although there is no such statutory privilege in Massachusetts, the courts of the
Commonwealth acknowledge that patients have a legitimate interest in having
their communications with their physicians, as well as their medical records,
withheld from public scrutiny. 4 The American Medical Association supports
the duty of confidentiality which has been an ethical constraint in the medical
profession for many years as evidenced by the physician's Hippocratic Oath.'"

(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (limiting access to sexually-transmitted disease records).
" Alberts, 395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d at 120. There are at least five states which
do not recognize the physician-patient privilege: Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island. Dina Khajezadeh, PatientConfidentiality Statutes in Medicare &
MedicaidFraudInvestigations, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 105, 114 n.56 (1987).
'2 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380, nn.3, 5, & 6, §§ 2388-2391 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961).
'3 Cf.Alberts, 395 Mass. at 66, 479 N.E.2d at 118 (emphasizing the importance
of
complete disclosure by patients). The justifications for the states' enactment of a
physician-patient privilege have been to promote public health and ensure the individual's
statutory right to privacy. Khajezadeh, supra note 11, at 114-15.
"'See Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 522-23, 467
N.E.2d 126, 136-37 (1984) (recognizing confidentiality as an essential component of the
physician-patient relationship). Massachusetts does recognize the psychotherapist-patient
privilege as codified by Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 233, section 20B. See
Alberts, 395 Mass. at 67-68, 479 N.E.2d at 119 (discussing confidentiality of medical
facts).
s See Bernard Friedland, HIV Confidentialityand the Right to Warn - The Health
CareProvidersDilemma, 80 MAss. L. REv. 3, 4 (1995) (discussing ethical considerations
in confidentiality). The AMA has expressed that physicians "shall respect the rights of
patients... and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law." Id.
(citing American Medical Association, Principlesof Medical Ethics IV (rev. ed. 1981)).
A former president of the AMA stated, however, with respect to HIV, "the physician has
a responsibility to inform the spouse. This is more than an option. This is a professional
responsibility." Id. (citation omitted).
One version of the Hippocratic Oath states "[w]hat I may see or hear in the course of
the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no
account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be
spoken about" Id. at 3 (citation omitted). There are many versions of the Hippocratic Oath
taken by physicians. Id. The different versions are a result of various translations from the
original Greek oath. Id.at 3-4 n.4.
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Courts acknowledge that the duty of confidentiality is not absolute." The
benefits of a strict confidentiality policy are weighed against the states' interest
in protecting public health. 7 Disclosure is allowed when strict confidentiality
'
prevents the furtherance of the "supervening interest of society."18
The
physician therefore possesses a qualified privilege to disclose otherwise
confidential information when necessary to prevent the spread of disease."
In Massachusetts, however, there exists a specific mandate of
confidentiality with respect to HIV test results.2' This statute, enacted in 1986,
provides that a physician may not test any person for HIV nor disclose the
results of such test to any person other than the patient without first obtaining
the patient's written informed consent.2' It further provides
that whoever
22
violates this section is subject to a private cause of action.
In opposition to the statute, Massachusetts case law authorizes a physician
'
to warn third parties to whom their patient presents a "serious danger."23
Alberts was the first Massachusetts case to enunciate the requirement of a
physician warning, as well as the first reported time the SJC expressly adopted
the physician-patient privilege.24 The court held that a duty of confidentiality did
arise from the relationship, violation of which gives rise to a cause of action
against the physician absent a serious danger to the patient or others. 25 The
court, however, failed to assert what constitutes a "serious danger."

" See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602, 97 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1976) (noting
disclosure is not automatically an impermissible invasion of privacy) ; Home v. Patton, 291
Ala. 701, 706, 287 So. 2d 824, 827 (1973) (stating patient enjoys only a limited right);
Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 196, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (1958) (holding one may have
conditional privilege to reveal confidential information).
"' Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962).
8

Id.

"See Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (holding
that there is no common law physician-patient privilege to prevent disclosure).
21 MASS. GEN. L. ch. I11, § 70F (1994).
21

Id.

2 Id.

' Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (1985).
2 Id. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124. The Alberts decision is the first time the SJC
acknowledged that a physician's disclosure of confidential information without the patient's
consent gives rise to a civil cause of action. Id. at 65, 479 N.E.2d at 118.
'3 Id. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124.
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B. The Duty to Warn
Case law in several states requires physicians to warn third parties who are
endangered by their patients even if it means breaching their duty of

confidentiality.'

The common law, however, does not require that a person

warn one who is endangered by a third person's conduct." The principal case
concerning the duty to warn is Tarasoffv. Regents of Universityof California"
in which the Supreme Court of California held that "a doctor... treating a
physical illness, bears a duty to use reasonable care to give threatened persons
such warnings as are essential to avert foreseeable danger arising from his
'
patient's condition or treatment." 29
The court noted that the interest in
safeguarding confidential information must be weighed against the public's
interest in safety. It concluded that the policy favoring confidentiality must

' See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,706, 287 So. 2d 824, 831 (1973) (finding

disclosure ofpatient information to employer constituted invasion of privacy); Simonsen v.
Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (finding no common law
privilege); Alberts, 395 Mass. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124 (holding that physician owes duty
of confidentiality "absent... a serious danger... to others").
27 See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D. Neb. 1980)
(adopting the Restatement approach to find a sufficient basis for a psychotherapist duty to
warn); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133, 529 P.2d 553, 557
(1974) (restating common law rule and noting those exceptions that impose a duty to warn).
The Tarasoffcourtadopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts §315 as an exception to the
common law rule. Tarasoff, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133, 529 P.2d at 557. According to the
Restatement, a person is required to control a third person's conduct, or warn those
enlangered by it if (1) he has a special relationship with the third person or with the person
who is endangered, or (2) he can reasonably foresee the danger. See id. (citing Restatement
2d Torts §§ 315-20); accordLipari, 497 F. Supp at 191 (adopting Restatement §315 as
special exception); see also J. David Butts, Ph. D., HIVIAIDS-Related Information and the
Rule of Confidentiality: Can We Accept Exceptions?, 40 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 1, 29

(1994) (noting the special relationship exception).
2 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974).
2 Id. at 135, 529 P.2d at 559. In Tarasoff,a patient communicated to his therapist
his intention to kill a person whom the therapist identified as the girl the patient was
infatuated with (the victim). Id. at 132, 529 P.2d at 556. The patient was subsequently
released from the university hospital, where the therapist was employed, and proceeded to
murder the victim. Id. The victim's parents brought suit against the therapist for negligent
failure to warn. Id. The court held the therapist liable notwithstanding the lack of a special
relationship with the victim. Tarasoff,118 Cal. Rptr. at 131, 529 P.2d at 555. The court
noted that "[w]hen a doctor or a psychotherapist, in the exercise of his professional skill and
knowledge, determines, or should determine, that a warning is essential to avert danger
arising from the medical or psychological condition of his patient, he incurs a legal
obligation to give that warning." Id.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. II

succumb to a policy of disclosure when necessary to prevent danger to others.*
In Simonsen v. Swenson,3 the Nebraska Supreme Court justified
disclosure, stating, "[n]o patient can expect, that, if his malady is found to be of
a dangerously contagious nature, he can still require it to be kept secret from
those to whom, if there was no disclosure, such disease would be transmitted."3 2

Massachusetts has already adopted the Tarasoffrationale in part.3 3 Courts
following Tarasoff would admittedly acknowledge a duty to warn known

individuals who have had sexual contacts with an infected patient of the
possibility of transmission. 4
Several courts have adopted the Tarasoffduty to warn in some form.35 For
example, in Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,3 the United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska held that the therapist-patient relationship "gives
'
rise to an affirmative duty for the benefit of third persons."37
This duty, the
court explained, mandates the physician to protect potential third party victims
from the patient and arises when the physician is aware, or should be aware, of
the risk of harm to others.3" Following the principle enunciated in Tarasoff,the

SJC held that a physician owes a duty not to disclose confidential medical
information without the patient's consent except to meet a serious danger to the
patient or others.3 9

Id. at 137, 529 P.2d at 560.
104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
32 Id. at 225, 177 N.W. at 832.
-3
Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 67-68, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119 (1985). The
Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Tarasoff rationale by creating an exception to the
physician's duty of confidentiality which is applicable when their patient poses a serious
harm to themselves or others. Id. This was the basis for liability in the Tarasoffdecision.
See Tarasoff,118 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 529 P.2d at 559 (imposing duty to warn of foreseeable
dangers).
' Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Between a Rock and a HardPlace: AIDS and the
Conflicting Physician's Duties of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding
Confidentiality, 76 GEo. L.J. 169, 182 (1987).
31 See, e.g., Alberts, 395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d at 120 (mandating physician
to
disclose information when required to "meet a serious danger to the patient or to others");
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489, 403 A.2d 500, 511 (1979) (holding
psychiatrist has duty to warn third parties when possibility of danger presented by patient);
MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805, 84 A.D.2d 482, 487 (1982) (requiring
physician to disclose when patient presents danger to others).
' 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
17 Id. at 193.
30

31

Id.
39 Albertsv. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (1985).
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With respect to H1V, jurisdictions are not inconformity concerning the duty
to warn. Some states mandate that physicians report the patient's HIV status to
public health authorities or persons known to be at risk, thus imposing a "duty
to protect." Other states have authorizeddisclosure when necessary to prevent
foreseeable danger, thus merely recognizing an exception to the duty of
confidentiality.'
Still others prohibit disclosure altogether 2
All states,
however, mandate the reporting of AIDS, as well as all other communicable
diseases, to public health officials.4'
Consistent with the policy justifications, a duty to warn is systematically
imposed on physicians in cases involving communicable diseases. As a general
rule, physicians are obligated to warn others of exposure to communicable and
infectious diseases. To protect public health and curtail the spread of disease,
most states enacted statutes requiring physicians to report all such diseases to
local health officials.' The physician is placed in a position where it becomes
his duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from injury or danger, and is
liable for failure to do so.45 Thus, a physician who treats a patient for a
communicable disease is under a duty to warn those who, by reason of family
ties or otherwise, are reasonably likely to come into contact with the patient.
This duty has been consistently upheld by state courts and affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court, which concluded that disclosure is an essential
part of modem medicine and neither deprives the patient of a constitutional right

40

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1402 (1989 Replacement Vol. & Supp. 1995)

(requiring any attendant physician to report known cases within 24 hours).
41 See CAL. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE § 121015(b) (West 1996) (permitting

disclosure to partners after attempt to get consent from patient fails).
42 See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (1994) (requiring consent before any disclosure).
43 See, e.g., MAss. REGS. CODE TIT. 105, § 300.140 (1987) (listing diseases
reportable to public health department); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A - 135 (1987) (mandating
reporting of communicable diseases by physicians); O.R. REV. STAT. § 433.045 (1988)
(prohibiting disclosure except as per rules); see also Donald H. J. Hermann & Rosalind D.
Gagliano, AIDS, TherapeuticConfidentiality,and Warning Third Parties,48 MD. L. REV.

55, 56 (1989) (stating that legislation in every state mandates the reporting of AIDS).
44 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0031 (West 1993) (mandating reporting of
diseases of "public health significance"); MASS. REGS. CODE Trr. 105, § 300.140 (1987)
(requiring disclosure to public health department); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
81.041 (West 1992) (specifying HIV and AIDS as reportable diseases).
'5 See Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, The Duty to Notify Private Third
Partiesof the Risks ofHIVInfection, 21 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 295, 297 (1988) (discussing
liability in the wake of Tarasoff).
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nor violates the patient's privacy.'
To date, no court has specifically ruled on the existence, or non-existence,
physician's duty to warn third parties of the risk of exposure to HIV. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court of Alaska in Chizmar v. Mackie4 ' held that "when
a physician diagnoses a patient with a fatal, sexually transmitted disease such as
AIDS, the physician's disclosure of this diagnosis to the patient's spouse is
privileged as a matter of law."
Consistent with the policies supporting the duty to warn, many states have

implemented contact tracing.49 Contact tracing is a system of notification
designed to prevent further transmission of communicable diseases by alerting
those who have been exposed to an infected person.' It is used in conjunction
with reporting procedures and is carried out by public health officials."

Practiced in the United States since the 1930's, contact tracing continues as a
form of medical surveillance and public health protection in several states."
C. The StatutoryRight to Privacy
There is yet another barrier which may prevent physicians from warning

persons at risk of contracting HIV from their patients. A physician who
discloses a patient's test results without his express consent may be held liable

for an invasion of the patient's privacy." The Massachusetts "privacy statute"
* See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921) (holding failure
to warn nurses and attendants that patient had typhoid fever was negligent); Skillings v.
Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (finding that failure to warn of infectious
nature of scarlet fever was not negligent); Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456
(1928) (holding physician treating patient with small pox has duty to notify those in
dangerous proximity to patient). The Davis court specified that physicians have a duty to
warn "regardless of the rules and regulations of the State Board of Health." Davis, 147
Ark. at 387, 27 S.W. at 614; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602, 97 S. Ct. 869,
878 (1976) (requiring reporting "even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the
character of the patient").
47 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
48 Id. at 208.
Karen I-. Rothenberg, The AIDS Project: Creatinga Public Health Policy - Rights
and ObligationsofHealth Care Workers, 48 MD. L. REV. 93, 180-82 (1989).
'o Id. at 180.
s Id. at 181.
32

Id. at 180-81.

" See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 709, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (1973)
(recognizing action for invasion of privacy rights by unwarranted publication by physician);
Barber v. Time, 348 Mo. 1199, 1207-08, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942) (holding right to
privacy includes right to have information given to a physician kept confidential); Doe v.
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states that "[a] person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or

serious interference with his privacy." The SJC interprets this statute as
"proscrib[ing] the required disclosure of facts about an individual that are of a
highly personal or intimate nature when there exists no legitimate countervailing
interest.""1 Whether preserving public health in the face of the AIDS epidemic
constitutes a "legitimate countervailing interest" is an issue on which this article
advocates for an affirmative response.
An individual's right to privacy accedes to the maintenance of public
health.' Thus, the state has a "fundamental right to enact laws which promote
public health, welfare and safety, even though such laws may invade the
[individual's] right of privacy.""7 Following this basic tenet, the United States
Supreme Court held that although the constitutional right to privacy
encompasses a patient's interest in preserving the confidentiality of personal
information, this right is not absolutess
III. ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT

Massachusetts law currently mandates disclosure of AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases to the Department of Public Health within twenty
four hours after diagnosis. Yet the law concurrently prohibits disclosure of HIV,
the virus which causes AIDS. 9 There seems to be no justification for this
contradiction. The policy behind the reporting statutes is to protect public health
by preventing the spread of disease.'
The Commonwealth can limit

Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 676, 93 A.D.2d 201, 213 (1977) (approving cause of action for
invasion of patient's privacy rights).
'4 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214, § 1B (1995). Prior to the enactment of this statute,
Massachusetts courts did not recognize a common law action for invasion of privacy.
Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 77, 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1979).
" Brattv. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 518, 467 N.E.2d 126,
133-34 (1984); see also Tower v. Hirschhorn, 397 Mass. 581, 588, 492 N.E.2d 728, 733
(1986) (holding defendant liable for unreasonable interference of privacy).
s' See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276, 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996
(1985) (noting right to privacy not absolute). The Kathleen court cited examples of such
laws where the state's fundamental right to protect its citizens outweighs the right of
privacy. Id. The examples given included penal laws concerning forcible and consensual
sex acts, registration of convicted sex offenders, and paternity laws. Id.
57Id.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1976).
MASS. PEGS. CODE tit. 105, § 300.140 (1987); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F
(1994).
' Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 175.
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transmission of HIV from the start, by including HIV in the list of reportable
diseases, rather than waiting until a diagnosis of AIDS, by which time the
disease has most likely spread.
Unnecessary transmission to even one innocent person is simply unjustified
when the means to prevent it are within reach. Continuing to focus on AIDS, as
opposed to HIV, is ineffectual. 6 Additionally, the duty of confidentiality
enunciated in the HIV statute conflicts with the duty to warn imposed by the
Alberts decision. The need for clear standards is indisputable. State law must
provide consistency and relieve physicians of the anguishing decision between
liability to the patient or to the person infected by the patient. Commentators
have noted that "[t]oo much in the law itself compels, justifies, and excuses
disclosure . ... "62 Mandated reporting in certain situations and limited contact
tracing are ways to achieve such imperative objectives.
Reporting statutes are held to be constitutional and not violative of any duty
owed by the physician.63 Imposing a legal requirement to report HIV
seropositivity to public health officials appears constitutional under the doctrine
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe,' provided
that "(1) the information were reasonably related to a valid public health
purpose; (2) the information were limited to public health departments; and (3)
'
there were adequate statutory confidentiality protections in place."65
Adding

HI to the list of reportable diseases is consistent with the purposes of existing
reporting procedures to protect public health by preventing further transmission
of a dangerous, communicable disease.'
It is also consistent with

"

Closen & Isaacman, supra note 45, at 298.

6' Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Limits ofAIDS Confidentiality,259 JAMA 3449, 3451

(1988).
Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04, 87 S. Ct. 877 (1976).
" 429 U.S. 589, 97 S. Ct. 869 (1976).
's Dickens, supra note 62, at 3451. In Whalen, the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed the conflict between the government's interest in public health and the
individual's interest in privacy. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-604, 97 S. Ct. at 875-79. It held
that a New York statute that required physicians who prescribe schedule 11drugs, which
include opium, cocaine, methadone, and amphetamines, to send a copy of the prescription
containing the patient's name, address, and age, to the state health department did not
violate constitutionally protected rights of privacy. Id. at 603-04, 97 S. Ct. at 879. Under
the minimum rationality test applied by the Court, collection of HIV information by state
health departments would be permissible because the state has a reasonable public health
interest in tracking and collecting information about the disease. Id. at 602, 97 S. Ct. at
878.
" See Hermann & Gagliano, supra note 43, at 71 (citing the potential for
transmission as the principal argument in favor of reporting).
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Massachusetts case law in that the SJC has stipulated that physicians must warn
third parties who face a "serious danger" posed by their patients.67 There can be
no question that HIV constitutes a serious harm because it is a fatal disease for
which there is no known cure.

Contact tracing used in conjunction with the reporting procedure for HIV
best facilitates the protection of identifiable victims. Adopting a system similar
to those in Texas, Colorado, or California, for example, would authorize
physicians and/or public health officials to notify the patient's spouse or known
sexual partner of the risk of infection."8 This policy would restrict notification
to those persons readily identifiable as required by the Tarasoffholding and
subsequent cases.69 It would also help stifle the rapid transmission rate among
spouses.7" The duty to notify should be strictly limited to the public health
department because it has traditionally been the authority for disease
prevention." The physician's primary responsibility and ultimate loyalty is, and
should remain, to the patient. Physicians are not trained counselors and cannot
reasonably be expected to shoulder the responsibility of contact notification.
Public health officials are far better equipped to handle notification with
discretion and expertise.72
Contact tracing is not without it's detractors. Some authorities contend that
contact tracing violates the duty of confidentiality owed by the physician to the
patient." It is held, however, that such a system does not force physicians to
breach any duty owed to the patient because the duty of confidentiality is not
absolute and information may be disclosed "to such persons as is necessary to
prevent the spread of the disease."74 Further, the above argument is not

v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124.
a See CAL. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE § 121015 (West 1996) (authorizing disclosure
to spouse of patient, needle sharing contacts, and known sexual partners); COLO.REv.
STAT. § 25-4-1402 (1989 Replacement Vol. & Supp. 1995) (requiring physician to report
HIV status); TEx. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE ANN. § 81.041 (West 1992) (listing HIV as
a reportable disease).
Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135, 529 P.2d 553, 559
(1974); see also Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 730, 102 Cal. App. 3d
594, 600 (1980) (finding duty owed only to readily identifiable third parties).
" See Piorkowski, supra note 34, at 173 (noting 12 of 14 spouses who had regular
sexual relations with their HIV-infected spouse, who used condoms intermittently or not at
all, contracted the disease) (citations omitted).
' Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 181.
n Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 181.
" Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 181.
'Alberts

' Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920).
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compelling when we consider existing laws which require the reporting of other
communicable diseases such as genital herpes which, like HIV, is sexually
transmittable, incurable and has a long latency period."
The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in protecting the health of its
citizens.7 The policies behind reporting statutes and contact tracing programs
reflect this fimdamental goal of preserving public health. Massachusetts, as well
as other states, should further this interest by modifying the existing statute to
mandate physicians to report HIV status to the department of public health. In
turn, the department of public health should implement a limited contact tracing
program notifying specific individuals, known to be at risk of infection."' To
achieve the dual goals of safeguarding public health and protecting the patient's
confidentiality to the extent possible, the contact is notified of exposure, offered
testing and counseling, but the name of the patient is not disclosed.
Another argument in opposition to the reporting of HIV and associated
contact tracing programs is that these programs deter some individuals from
being tested and seeking medical treatment, thus defeating the state's legitimate
interest in controlling the transmission of the disease.78 While this is certainly
a possibility, the advantages to such programs far outweigh the possible
deterrent effect. I1V reporting allows the government to trace the epidemiology
of the disease and provides a mechanism for follow-up behavior modification
and research. More importantly, reporting and contact tracing serve to notify
spouses, and other known contacts, effectively saving lives. Notification is
especially important in cases where the spouse is pregnant. With treatments
available to prevent prenatal transmission, the possibility of saving a newborn
substantially outweighs the possibility of a slight drop in the number of
individuals tested.79

7 William Sundbeck, It Takes Two to Tango: Rethinking Negligence Liabilityfor
the Sexual TransmissionofAids, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 397, 407 (1995).
76 Butts, supra note 27, at 20.

" See Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 181. A contact tracing program would also
include the notification of spouses of HIV infected persons as already undertaken in
California. CAL. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE § 121015 (West 1996).

'

See Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 181 (discussing contact tracing as a viable

method of preserving confidentiality while controlling transmission).
' The relative number of cases of HIV among children has been steadily increasing.
KURT J. ISSELBACHER ET. AL., HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE at 1572
(13th ed. 1994). By June 1, 1993, 4615 children in the United States under the age of
thirteen were infected with HIV and greater than fifty percent have died. Id. Ninety four

percent of the pediatric cases were attributed to perinatal transmission.

BERNARD N. FIELDS
ET. AL., FIELD'S VIROLOGY 1966 (3d ed. 1996). This is simply too grave a risk to take when

given the alternative of relinquishing a small portion of an individual's privacy. There are
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Other authorities claim that HIV infection commands special protection due
to the stigma and societal discrimination which may result from disclosure.'

Again, this argument simply does not warrant a policy that undermines public
health concerns nor justifies a physician's failure to warn. Tarasoffteachesus

that the moderately inconsequential discrimination suffered by an infected
patient must be weighed against the grave risk that an uninfected person will
become infected."' Although a person suffering at the hands of AIDS
discrimination may bring an action to redress the harm done, the now infected
person faces certain death for which no legal action can compensate.82 The

American Medical Association lent support to this argument by stating that it is
"of critical importance" that "individuals who are not infected with the AIDS
virus must have every opportunity to avoid transmission of the disease to
4 3
them.'
Although some worthy arguments have been advanced in opposition to
reporting and tracing procedures, they are substantially outweighed by the
exacting harm which results from the absence of such procedures. The mortal
fate awaiting unsuspecting spouses and their unborn children cannot be justified
by a policy calculated to preserve the confidentiality and privacy of the
individual who is infected. The focus must be on the sanctity of human life.
IV. PRACTITIONER'S NOTES
The legal responses to the IV virus are causing permutations of traditional
legal policies. They are extremely controversial and far reaching in their
implications. Although these responses are sharply divided by jurisdiction, there
are a number of actions available. Massachusetts practitioners should be aware
of the possible defenses which may be raised when confronted with a charge that
a physician violated the HIV or privacy statute, breached the duty of
confidentiality, or failed to warn a third party.84 Although the legislature did not

a number of treatments that exist, the most prevalent being administration of AZT, which
significantly reduce the transmission of the virus to newborns. Id. at 1966.
s Piorkowski, supra note 34, at 183.
m Piorkowski, supra note 34, at 183.
Piorkowski, supra note 34, at 183.
Butts, supra note 27, at 25 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Butts, supra note 27, at 35 (illustrating common law doctrine of
necessity); Friedland, supra note 15, at 7-20 (explaining common law defenses available);
Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician'sTort Liability For UnauthorizedDisclosure of
Confidential InformationAbout Patient,48 A.L.R. 4th 668, 703-13 (1995) (citing the

available defenses to a charge of violating practitioner duties).
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specifically incorporate defenses to a statutory violation of the HIV and privacy
statutes,
the weight of authority suggests that common law defenses continue to
85
apply.
A. The H1V Statute

The H1V statute expressly provides for a private cause of action.86 To date,
however, the SJC has not addressed the scope of the statute's protection.87 In
Attorney General v. Bodimetric Profiles,88 the court addressed the issue of

testing for HIV without consent but did not elaborate on the boundaries of the
statute because the conduct in question was prohibited on the face of the
statute."9 The plain meaning of the statute, however, reveals the precarious
liability a physician may face if he or she discloses a patient's HIV test results
to a third party.9
One possible defense, based on the wording of the statute, may be available
in situations where the physician notified a third person known to be at risk
based on a purely clinical diagnosis of the patient.9' There are no test results to
reveal because such a diagnosis is symptomatical. In support of this argument,
the practitioner could conceivably cite the Alberts decision and the assumption
that HIV poses a "serious danger."
Common law defenses which may be asserted against a charge of a
statutory violation may also provide some degree of hope. The common law
"defense of others justification" and the "doctrine of necessity" are two such
defenses. Although the SJC has had little opportunity to elaborate on the
elements of the "defense of others justification," it has asserted that:
[a]n actor isjustified in using force against another to protect a third person
s See sources cited supra note 84.

MAss. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (1994).
Friedland, supra note 15, at 13.

* 404 Mass. 152, 533 N.E.2d 1364 (1989).
" Id. at 155-56, 533 N.E.2d at 1366.
'o See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (1994).
" Friedland, supra note 15, at 9-10.
Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (1985). Although the
Alberts decision did not specify how certain the physician must be of the danger, the
Tarasoffcourtlends support in this area. Friedland, supra note 15, at 12-13. The Tarasoff
court indicated that virtual certainty was not a prerequisite to disclosure. See Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136, 529 P.2d 553, 560 (1974) (discussing
standard to apply to therapist). The therapist is to exercise that degree of skill and care
which is ordinarily possessed by members of the psychiatric profession under similar
circumstances. Id.
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when (a) a reasonable person in the actor's position would believe his
intervention to be necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b)
in the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be,
the third person would be justified in using such force to protect himself.93
The foreseeable problem with this defense, when used in the HIV context,
concerns the possibility that the third person is unaware of the risk of harm and
thus, unaware that they are justified in protecting themselves.94 However, the
defense only mandates that the third person be justified, not that they be aware
of the risk of harm.95
The doctrine of necessity may also offer a safeguard against liability. This
defense, as used in criminal law, provides a safe harbor for those who violate the
law intending to preserve human life.' Given the modem scientific knowledge
regarding HIV transmission, a willful violation of the HIV statute committed to
prevent an individual from becoming infected with the disease is a credible
attempt to preserve human life.9' As noted, "[c]ourts may ... fird that a
defendant's sense of necessity to save life invokes pervasive values that the
legislation does not intend to displace- because they concern not just the
transitory preference of public health policy but also the enduring sentiments of
the people concerning the sanctity of life."
B. The PrivacyStatute
Given the available case law, a violation of the privacy statute affords the
practitioner greater leeway in constructing a defense. The Massachusetts privacy
statute provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person shall have a right against
unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy." The SJC
has interpreted this statute to proscribe disclosure of facts which are highly
personal in nature "when there exists no legitimate countervailing interest."' °

93 See Friedland, supra note 15, at 15 (quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass.
640, 649, 341 N.E.2d 885, 891 (1976)).
- Friedland, supra note 15, at 15.
95 Friedland, supra note 15, at 15.
Dickens, supra note 62, at 3450.
Dickens, supra note 62, at 3450.
" Dickens, supra note 62, at 3450.
MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 214, § 1B (1995).
"0 Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 518, 467 N.E.2d
126, 133-34. The court in Bratt held that disclosure of medical information to the patient's
employer without consent was not a violation of the privacy statute because it was
reasonably necessary to ser a substantial and valid interest. Id. at 524, 467 N.E.2d at 137.
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Disclosure of HIV status is unquestionably personal in nature. Therefore, the
issues of whether the interference is reasonable and whether there exists a
legitimate countervailing interest are the focal points of the determination of
liability.
There is scant judicial authority on the issue of when a disclosure is
reasonable under the statute. It can be argued, however, that if disclosure is
motivated by the propensity to protect human life, it is certainly reasonable.
Additionally, several authorities have implied that the preservation of life and
public health also constitutes a legitimate countervailing
interest sufficient to
0
warrant breach of the patient's right to privacy.' '
C. Breach of Confidentiality

A physician's duty of confidentiality generally stems from the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship and is recognized by statute or case
law in almost every state."°2 When representing a physician charged with
breaching this duty, the practitioner should first determine whether the patient
has waived the physician-patient privilege because this supplies a full defense
to the charge. 03
Several states have recognized an exception to the duty of confidentiality
where disclosure is necessary to protect the health, welfare, or safety of

o' See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602, 97 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1976) (holding that
the duty of confidentiality is not absolute); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 118 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 137, 529 P.2d 553, 561 (noting that confidentiality must yield to need to protect
others); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 75, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (1985) (noting
confidentiality is required absent "serious danger"); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 324,
173 N.W. 663, 663 (1919) (examining relationship between physician and patient);
Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 225, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (discussing the duty
to report absent legislative protection); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 197, 331 P.2d
814, 817-18 (1958) (finding existence of a duty due to threat to public health); see also
Dickens, supranote 62, at 3451 (commenting on legal consequences of disclosure); Closen
& Isaacman, supra note 45, at 301 (emphasizing need to prevent HIV transmission is
paramount).
02 There are a few jurisdictions which have refused to recognize a cause of action
against a physician for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Zelin, supra
note 84, at 691-92. These jurisdictions continue to follow the common law rule, which
does not recognize the physician-patient privilege, and have not enacted statutes providing
for such a privilege. Zelin, supra note 84, at 691-92; see also Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F.
Supp. 591,598 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (stating no case in jurisdiction recognizing such a cause
of action); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp 322, 324 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (holding no
confidential relationship between physician and patient).
303 Zelin, supra note 84, at 677.
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society. 1" Other states have allowed disclosure of confidential medical
information to the patient's spouse based on the marital relationship." Under
these circumstances, it can be argued that the physician has a qualified privilege
to disclose HlV status.
D. Failureto Warn

A cause of action may arise against a physician for failure to warn. A
common scenario is that of a spouse infected with HIV who asserts that
transmission could have been prevented had the physician warned her/him about
the patient's seropositivity. It is unclear whether the Commonwealth courts
would recognize this cause of action. Considering that a failure to warn action
lies in tort, the most sound defense concerns the requisite causation factor. To
prevail, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
physician's failure to warn indeed caused the illness. Even if other possible
channels of transmission, for example contaminated blood or dirty needles, are
ruled out, problems of proof endure. HIV may remain dormant in an infected
person leaving the individual asymptomatic for years. It is therefore, an onerous
task to determine how long a plaintiff has been infected. Consequently, a
plaintiff may have a difficult time proving he/she was infected after the physician

diagnosed the individual's condition.
V. CONCLUSION

Physicians should not continue to face the indeterminate legal consequences
exacted upon them by present Massachusetts law. The inimitable response is for
"4 See Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,709, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (1973) (recognizing

exception to duty where supervening interests of society or private interest of patient
intervene); Alberts, 395 Mass. at 68, 479 N.E.2d at 119 (permitting disclosure when
necessary to "meet a serious danger to the patient or to others"); Simonsen, 104 Neb. at 225,
177 N.W. at 832 (1920) (allowing disclosure when necessary to prevent the spread of
disease); Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962) (holding where

public interest demands, disclosure allowed to person with legitimate interest in patient's
health); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805, 84 A.D.2d 482, 487 (1982)
(noting that confidentiality must yield to countervailing public interests when, for example,
a patient poses danger to self or others); Berry, 8 Utah 2d at 196, 331 P.2d at 817 (1958)

(recognizing conditional privilege to disclose as is reasonably necessary to protect a
sufficiently important interest).
,0s See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 208 (Alaska 1995) (holding

disclosure of AIDS or related disease to spouse is privileged as a matter of law); Pennison
v.Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 244
La. 1019, 156 So. 2d 226 (1963); Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471, 52 Misc. 2d
1035, 1037 (1966) (recognizing spouse has right to know existence of disease).
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the legislature to modify the current HIV statute to mandate reporting of HIV,
as all other contagious diseases, to the department of public health. Such an
undertaking would relieve physicians of the haphazard liability and present
ethical quandary, while controlling HIV transmission. The history of the law and
the continued health of our citizens demand this response.
The proposals set forth above are designed to thwart the rampant
transmission of a fatal communicable disease. HIV is an illness which is caused
by infection with a human retrovirus, not by homosexuality, drug abuse or
promiscuity. As education concerning this disease progresses, ignorance will
continue to decline. With sufficient anti-discrimination legislation in place, the
proposed means justify the end. An individual's privacy is paramount, but
human life is sacred.
CatherineAgnello

